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Here are descriptions of some of the courses related to modeling that have been offered recently in the Political Science Department. Many other courses treat specific models in the context of particular topics.

P.S. 598 Math for Political Science

This course attempts to equip students with basic mathematical tools necessary for the study of advanced statistical methods, game theory, and other types of formal modeling. Topics include set theory, matrix algebra, differential calculus, optimization and integral calculus. The level of mathematical sophistication presumed is high school algebra

P.S. 661. Proseminar On Theory Building In World Politics

This course begins with a discussion of the role theory plays in international politics research, and how we evaluate and compare these theories. We then will turn our attention for the bulk of the semester to detailed consideration of how general theory as well as theories of specific aspects of international politics have developed. This section of the course will heavily emphasize the role formal deductive theorizing has played in the development of international relations theory. No prior knowledge of formal models or of formal modeling techniques is required. Grades will be awarded based on a series of short papers, seminar participation and a final examination. (2/9/00)

P.S. 610 Economic Rationality/Politics

In this course, we will begin by studying two distinct underpinnings for the attainment of equilibria in games: full rationality and evolutionary selection. We will then apply these game theoretic concepts to problems in political economy, particularly focusing on the performance and emergence of institutions.

We will consider three distinct interpretations of institutions:

i.as the rules of the game that generate an equilibrium (e.g. Baron and Ferejohn)
ii.as coordination devices when multiple equilibria are present (Calvert)
iii.as the equilibria themselves

To understand the first interpretation requires dipping our toe into the field of mechanism design to pin down notions of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and implementation. The second interpretation relies on models of communication and cheap talk. And the third interpretation relies on an evolutionary story. For that, we'll borrow from Peyton Young's recent book on the evolution of institutions.
The substantive issues will include but not be limited to: the evolution of cooperation, punishment, conformity, and other norms, the role of political parties as coordinating devices, the importance of electoral institutions in determining political outcomes, and the implications of strategic versus sincere voting.

P.S. 651 Proseminar in Political Economy

This course is intended as an introduction to positive macro- and international political economy. Specifically, we will be focusing upon how certain political configurations (institutions, structures, etc.) and events (elections, coups, etc.) systematically produce certain sorts of economic policies and upon how these configurations and events might condition the effects of the policy so made. In other words, in this course, political economy is taken primarily to mean the politics and economics of macro- and international economic policy-making as opposed to (at least) three other broad areas of inquiry also referred to as political economy: (a) the (micro-)economics of politics, which studies how self-interested, rational policy-makers make choices in a politicized environment, employing the utility-maximization theories and tools of microeconomics; (b) normative political economy, which studies, alternatively, what economic policy should be enacted so as to produce ideal effects or what policy would be enacted under some set of ideal circumstances which do not necessarily (and often cannot) obtain; and (c) the political consequences of economic outcomes wherein political effects are treated as outputs of (usually exogenous) economic causes, e.g. the impact of unemployment on presidential approval. (These other political economy endeavors are of course valuable in their own right, and we will occasionally meet some of them, but our primary focus is on policy-making.) (10/21/98)

P.S. 664 Research Strategy & Methods in World Politics

This course focuses on research challenges confronting students of international politics. Most of the time nothing happens in international politics. Consequently, most international phenomena are rare events. Further, when these rare events do occur they are often strategically chosen to occur by one or more actors. When they don't occur it is often because they are strategically chosen not to occur. Appreciating the rare event nature of world politics and the strategic underpinnings of international action has important consequences for how we model and think about international affairs and for the inferences we can draw from our studies of world politics. In this class we will also address questions of operational definition and measurement of important concepts, while also reviewing what data readily exist for world politics researchers as well as consider independent data collection efforts. In order to see how well these concerns are taken into account in existing world politics research, students will have the opportunity to dissect published studies. Additionally, students will have the opportunity to produce research designs of their own during the latter part of the term. (10/12/98)

P.S. 681 Proseminar in Empirical Theory and Method

This course will introduce you to the use of formal models in political science. Most of the course will focus on decision theory and game theory, and we will finish the course with discussions of institutional design, given the strategic interaction of rational agents. The course's most basic contribution to your skills is to generate an appreciation of what formal models can and cannot do to aid our understanding of society and government. You will also improve your ability to read many formal papers in political science and develop the fundamental skills necessary to begin model-building of your own. Frequent problem sets and presentation of one published article will encourage interpretation and develop model-building skills; the course will also require a paper.

P.S. 793 Methods Seminar: Complexity Theory in the Social Sciences

Complexity theory is a new interdisciplinary approach to understanding dynamic processes involving the interaction of many actors. The course will consider a wide variety of applications of agent-based models to the social sciences, including residential segregation, cultural change, social influence, war, alliances, nation formation, organizational change, elections, and markets.
Among the issues to be examined across models are: path dependence, sensitivity to initial conditions, emergence of self-organized structure, adaptation to a changing environment, and criteria for judging the value of an agent-based model. There will be four exercises, and one major project.