

Things Every Comparativist Should Know
(Developed Democracies Edition)

NOTES: In all cases, this list is additional to sources in the PS641 reading list. Many of the below are textbook or review-article treatments, in such cases the works cited therein are suggested. Students may also find helpful the syllabus for Franzese's PS441 and the accompanying set of class notes. Some citations appear in more than one heading.

I. Social Structure and Politics

A. Modernization and Democratization Theories

1. Geddes, B., "What Do We Know About Democratization After 20 Years," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2:115-44.
2. Lane, J.-E., and S. Ersson, *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, ch. 1-2, pp. 15 - 101. (Not terribly well-written, but brief-yet-thorough on early-modern 2x2 comparative sociology. See Franzese PS441 Notes.)
3. **Plus PS641 "Political Development" Week**

B. Inequality and Politics: Capitalism and Democracy

1. Meltzer, A. and S. Richard. 1978. "Why Government Grows (and Grows) in a Democracy," *The Public Interest* 52: 111-8.
. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," *Journal of Political Economy* 89(5): 914-27.
2. Offe, C., "Competitive Party Democracy and the Keynesian Welfare State," in *Contradictions of the Welfare State*, chpt. 8, pp. 179-206.
3. Franzese, R., *Explaining Macroeconomic Policies*, ch. 1.

C. Cleavage Structures and Politics

1. Lane, J.-E., and S. Ersson, *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, ch. 1-2, pp. 15 - 101. (Not terribly well-written, but brief-yet-thorough on early-modern 2x2 comparative sociology. See Franzese PS441 Notes.)
2. See Franzese's Notes to PS441 at <http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese>
3. Gallagher, M., M. Laver, and P. Mair, *Representative Government in Modern Europe*, chpt. 9, pp. 209-41.
4. Dalton, R. "Political Cleavages, Issues, and Electoral Change," in LeDuc, Niemi & Norris, *Comparing Democracies*, chpt. 13.

H. Electoral Systems

- A. Cox, G., "Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2:145-62.
- B. Cox, G., *Making Votes Count: Strategic Votes in the World's Electoral Systems*.
- C. Lijphart, A., *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990* (Oxford UP: 1994).
- D. Gallagher, M., M. Laver, and P. Mair, *Representative Government in Modern Europe*, chpt. 11, pp. 271-300

III. Parties and Party Systems

- A. Stokes, S. "Political Parties and Democracy," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2:243-68.
- B. Clarke, H. and M. Stewart, "The Decline of Parties in the Minds of Citizens," *Annual Review of Political Science* 1:357-78.

- C. Mair, P. *The West European Party System*, entire. (excerpts from classic articles).
 - D. Gallagher, M., M. Laver, and P. Mair, *Representative Government in Modern Europe*, chpts. 7-10, pp. 151-270
 - E. Mair, P., "Party Systems" in LeDuc, Niemi & Norris, *Comparing Democracies*, ch.3.
 - F. **Plus PS641 "Parties and Elections" Week**
- 1V. Participation
- A. Explaining Cross-Individual Variation in Voting
 - B. Explaining Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Aggregate Variation in Voting
 - C. Interest Groups and Extra-Voting Means of Participation
 - 1. Bashevkin, S., "Interest Groups and Social Movements," in LeDuc, Niemi & Norris, *Comparing Democracies*, ch. 5.
 - 2. Lichbach, M. "Contending Theories of Contentious Politics and the Structure-Action Problem of Social Order," *Annual Review of Political Science* 1:401-24.
 - 3. **Plus PS641 "Interest Groups and Interest Intermediation" and "Participation and Collective Action" Week**
- V. Voting and Choosing Representatives
- A. Lewis-Beck, M. and M. Stegmaier, "Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes," *Annual Review of Political Science* 3:183-220.
 - B. Converse, P., "Assessing the Capacity of Mass Electorates," *Annual Review of Political Science* 3:331-54.
 - C. Evans, G. "The Continued Significance of Class Voting," *Annual Review of Political Science* 3:401-18.
 - D. Dalton, R., *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Western Democracies*, 2nd ed., (Chatham House: 1996).
 - E. Cox, G. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Votes in the World's Electoral Systems*.
- VI. Governments (Aggregate Institutional Variation)
- A. Presidential v. Parliamentary
 - 1. Lijphart, A., ed., *Parliamentary v. Presidential Government*.
 - 2. Shugart, M. and J. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*
 - B. Federal v. Unitary
 - 1. Watts, R. "Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Federations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 1: 117-38.
 - 2. ["Market-Preserving Federalism" piece. Weingast & ?. ????]
 - 3. [See Bednar's PSXXX syllabus...]
 - C. Other Macro-Institutional Variation
 - 1. Powell, G.B., *Contemporary Democracies*.
 - 2. North, D. and B. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England," *J of Econ Hist* 49(4):803-32.
 - 3. **Plus PS641 "Constitutions and Constitutionalism" Week**
- VII. Parliamentary Government Formation and Dissolution
- A. Gallagher, M., M. Laver, and P. Mair, *Representative Government in Modern Europe*, chpt. 12, pp. 301-35.

- B. Laver, M. "Models of Government Formation," *Annual Review of Political Science* 1:1-26.
 - C. Laver, M. and K. Shepsle, *Making and Breaking Governments*.
 - D. King, G., J. Alt, N. Bums, and M. Laver. 1990. "A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies," *American Journal of Political Science* 34(3): 847-71.
- VIII. Policy & Outcome Implications
- A. Gallagher, M., M. Laver, and P. Mair, *Representative Government in Modern Europe*, chpt. 13, pp. 336-58.
 - B. Franzese, *Explaining Macroeconomic Policies*, esp. ch. 1-3,5.
 - C. **Plus PS641 "Policymaking" Week**